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Abstract
Somalia is by scholars viewed as the definition of a “failed State”. Somalia has 
been without a central and efficient government since 1991 and is still troubled by 
internal fighting and the lack of central control over the means of violence. In 
2004, the 14th attempt to establish a government since 1991 was initiated, this 
interim government had no civil service or government buildings and it faced a 
formidable task in bringing reconciliation to a country deeply divided. Its author-
ity was further compromised in 2006 by the rise of The Union of Islamic Courts
who gained control of much of the south, including the capital.
The present international system, composed for the most part of sovereign, 
territorial States, is often viewed as the inevitable outcome of historical develop-
ment. State as we today know it has its origin in the Treaty of Westphalia signed 
in 1648 following the Thirty Years War. States that are not possible to provide the 
duties stated in the Treaty are frequently being referred to as weak, collapsed or 
failed and they posses a problem for the international community as a whole.
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the implications that be-
ing “failed” has for a State in the international community. In particularly I exam-
ine Somalia and how the international community has treated Somalia as a 
“failed” State. I believe that the international community plays a big role in what 
implications being “failed” have for a State. 
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11 Introduction
Somalia is viewed by scholars as the definition of a “failed State”. Somalia has 
been without a central and efficient government since 1991 and is still troubled by 
internal fighting and the lack of central control over the means of violence. In 
2004, after prolonged talks in Kenya, the main warlords and politicians signed a 
deal to set up a new parliament, which later appointed a president, Abdullahi Yu-
suf.1
This administration, the 14th attempt to establish a government since 
1991, had at the time no civil service or government buildings and it faced a 
formidable task in bringing reconciliation to a country deeply divided. It was until 
recently based in Baidoa, many miles to the north of Mogadishu, and had little if 
no influence beyond its base. Its authority was further compromised in 2006 by 
the rise of The Union of Islamic Courts who gained control of much of the south, 
including the capital. This Islamist movement emerged out of a judicial system 
funded by the powerful business community to try and instill law and order and 
with its superior military strength it made a rapid advance, imposing Islamic law 
wherever it went. With the backing of Ethiopian troops, forces loyal to the TFG
however defeated the Islamists at the end of 2006.2 In January 2007 Islamists 
abandon their last stronghold, the port town of Kismayo and President Yusuf en-
tered Mogadishu for the first time since taking office in 2004. In January 2007 the 
USA also carried out air strikes in southern Somalia which it said to targeted al-
Qaeda personnel sheltered in the area and the Somali president further consented
theses attacks.3
The present international system, composed for the most part of sovereign, 
territorial States, is often viewed as the inevitable outcome of historical develop-
ment. The State is in fact an ancient human institution, but the modern State as we 
today know it has its origin in the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648 following 
the Thirty Years War. The Treaty provided recognition, in law as well as in fact, 
of the power and the authority of sovereign and independent States. Only they 
could at the time be considered subjects of international law and no universal 
authority was recognized.4 The architecture of this Treaty have provided the basic 
premises of international relations ever since. Politically, the Treaty recognized 
the “sovereign state” as the basic unit of world politics and the highest authority 
of civil society. Militarily, it accepted war as an instrument of policy only in con-
                                                                                                                                                        
1 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1072592.stm#leaders, 2007-05-21.
2 Id.
3 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1072611.stm, 2007-05-21.
4 Thakur, 2004. From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of 
States, p. 17.
2flicts between sovereign states; in other words, it was acceptable for one state to 
fight another for its own interests, but not because of internal affair within the 
other country.5
The high level of respect for national sovereignty that followed was 
heightened further after the horrors of World War I and World War II, as well as 
other wars between nations. These events provided strong support to the idea first 
ensconced in the League of Nations and then the United Nations: No nation 
should invade the territory of another, the non-intervention principal.6 Vital aspect 
of this international architecture, however, is the premise that its component parts, 
the sovereign States, are capable to function in a “Westphalian” sense, i.e. that 
they can exercise genuine control over at least the larger part of their territory and 
population and act as sovereign entities in the sense of cooperating with other 
States, govern according to the rule of law, respect international legal obligations, 
prevent crime etc. States that are not possible to provide the stated duties are fre-
quently being referred to as weak, collapsed or failed states and they posses a 
problem for the international community as a whole. 
On a general note it can be said that a failed or collapsed State is not in 
control over the means of violence and therefore can not ensure peace and se-
curity for its inhabitants or control the territory. Neither can the State ensure eco-
nomic growth or any reasonable distribution of social goods. These States are also 
often characterized by massive economic inadequacies, warlordism and violent 
competition for resources.7 Even if a States is considered to be collapsed or failed
their borders and legal personality are not been called in question. Such States 
does furthermore not loose their membership of international organizations and, 
for the most parts, their diplomatic relations remain intact. Though they are unable 
to enter into new treaty obligations, the international law treaties they have con-
cluded remain in force. The States concerned are in practice, however, not simply 
left to their fate. On the contrary, the collapse of a State anywhere in the world is 
seen as a matter for the international community.
Somalia has clearly in the past and as well as in the present being viewed 
as a failed state that is in need of the support from the international community.
1.1 Purpose
The term “failed” or “collapsed” State is somewhat of recent origin and has as 
such not yet been completely recognized in international law. Nevertheless, politi-
cians and academics use it, seemingly not always in a consistent way though.
Failed states are often described as conflicted, dangerous and contested by differ-
ent fractions. The governing power in a failed State is not capable of controlling 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 Etzioni, 2004. From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations, p. 137.
6 Id, p. 138.
7 Brooks, 2005. Failed States or States as Failure, p. 1160.
3the different peripheral regions and is unable or unwilling to perform the basic 
tasks of a State in the modern world, such as protecting its citizens from human 
rights violations. The infrastructure in a failed state is deteriorating or already de-
stroyed and mortal diseases like HIV enhance along with increasing rates of 
illiteracy and child mortality. The state is also unable to uphold the rule of law and 
democratic values.8
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the implications that be-
ing “failed” has for a State. In doing so I naturally seek to Somalia, the most failed 
State in the history of the UN. In particularly I wish to further examine the recent 
events taking place in Somalia, which include the US bombing in the south of 
Somalia and the Ethiopian trespassing into Somalia. With this paper I will try to 
illustrate that the international community by its action is in control over the 
implications that being “failed” will have for a State.
1.2 Method and Material
The objective of this essay is as stated above to contribute to the understanding of
the implications that being failed has for a States in international law as well as 
show the role that the international community plays concerning failed states. This 
paper follows both a broad perspective and a detailed focus. The broad per-
spective evaluates the different criteria for Statehood and failed States in general
as well as the implications for the State of concern as well as for the international
community, while the detailed focus lie on Somalia. This paper is aiming to be 
eclectic, therefore different perspectives and different resources are being used to 
guide me in trying to elaborate on my thesis of this paper. Mainly I have ap-
proached the subject using interpretive method for legal research in addition to a 
descriptive and analytical study of the legal sources. 
The used material contains mostly of traditional sources of law as well as 
academic commentaries and doctrine; books as well as articles from various legal 
reviews. In addition, non-legal books and articles have been important in the 
process of writing this paper. The concept of “failed” States is far more than a le-
gal one why I have felt it to be important to include other aspects of the concept in 
to this paper as well. Internet has also for this paper proven to be a valuable 
source of information. Most international organizations have easy accessible 
information on there web-pages which have helped to add to my understanding of 
the subject as well as gain information on the topic. Furthermore the web pages of 
BBC and Reuters have given me a lot of up to date information on Somalia.
Choosing to analyses a concept in international law and relations that has 
not been fully recognized does raise some methodology problems. Therefore I 
have tried to examine an extensive amount of literature in order to grasp the areas 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 Rotberg, 2003. Nation-State Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon? pp. 2-7.
4where scholars on the subject agree and for that matter disagree. Given the fact 
just stated it has been hard to stay completely objective throughout the thesis, but 
to promote intersubjectivity I have tried to explain my line of thoughts as thor-
oughly as possible as well as make it clear to the reader when I am expressing my 
opinion and when I am citing others.
1.3 Delimitations
Most research on the topic of failed states is focused on State and nation building 
and on how to prevent a State’s failure. The concern of this paper is to investigate 
the concept of failed States in the context of international law and the implications 
that this have when a state is considered de facto failed and that is why state, na-
tion building and other issues have limited room in this essay. Because of the lim-
ited extent of this thesis I have chosen to focus mainly on of the legal implications 
of the concept of State failure in the context of Somalia and the present events 
occurring there. But for the reader to get a grip of what state failure means and 
which questions it raises, causes of failure and State failure in the context of State 
definition as well as the international community will be explored in this paper as 
well.
1.4 Disposition
This first chapter of the paper has been focused on introducing the problem and 
purpose of this thesis as well as I have tried to give an introduction to the problem 
at hand that constitutes the base of this work. Methodological and material aspects 
have also in this first chapter been discussed to give a more profound under-
standing of the scope of the paper. The following chapters will further deepen the 
understanding the phenomenon of States and Statehood, the “international 
community” and of course the concept of “failed States” and in the end I will ap-
ply this to Somalia, where a discussion involving the different aspects presented 
so far in the paper will be held. Throughout the following text I will complement 
the empirical findings that I have made with thoughts of my own and in the final 
chapter of this work I will sum up as well as conclude on my findings.
52 Setting the context
2.1 Conceptualizing the International Community
The phrase “international community” is in this paper used to refer only to the 
community of States, and in that sense I also mainly refer to the UN as the most 
important forum for interaction between Sates in the international community, it 
should however be acknowledged that the international community also contains
an array of other actors whose actions influence the development of the inter-
national legal system. This includes intergovernmental organizations, inter-
national (and national) nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), transnational 
corporations and even individuals.9
I use this limited definition of the international community for three rea-
sons. First, because the concept of “failed” States is used to define only States and 
no other actors within the community, secondly the concept is usually used to 
legitimate actions taken by States towards other States and finally the concept of 
failed States is a concept that is strongly connected to the profound definition of 
States.
With that said however it is important to bear in mind that a wide array of 
actors participates in the formulation of international law and that various experts 
who have studied and written on the issue agree that the concept of an inter-
national community is wider than just States and the rationale for the existence of 
the international community also strongly suggests that the community comprises
not only by States, but also various non-State entities.10 Therefore it might seem 
that it does not serve any explicit goal to restrict international community to only 
State actors. For the purpose of this paper I however feel it to be both a necessary 
as well as an unavoidable distinction to make, and this because the international 
community in the sense of the UN is still mainly a forum in which States interact 
with each other as well as resolve eventual conflicts between each other, it is also 
the forum where States can be held responsible for wrongful actions.
The reference to the international community is found in several inter-
national legal instruments and documents. At the treaty level, one of the most 
well-known examples is the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
which defines jus cogens as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international
                                                                                                                                                        
9 Byers, (e.d.), 2003. United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, p. 27.
10 Id, p. 27.
6community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogations is permit-
ted.”11 Clearly, the Convention uses the term “international community” to refer 
only to States. A more recent treaty, however, that incorporates the term and also 
expands it, is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which limits 
the Court’s jurisdiction to “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole.”12 This seems to be a more comprehensive use of the 
term, insofar as the “international community” is not expressly limited to States.
There are also specific references to the international community in the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). There is, for example, the 
ICJ’s famous statement in the Barcelona Traction case13. Where the Court refers 
to the international community as a whole, the ICJ has furthermore invoked this
term in several other cases. The ICJ is however referring to certain legal obli-
gation that the State has, which should indicate that even if the international 
community is seen as more than just States the State is still the main actor within
the international community. 14
Finally, it is worth noting that the term international community is some-
times used by way of distinguishing it from what it is not rather than designating 
what it is. This seems to be the basis on which some States have at times been re-
ferred to as “rogue States,” “pariah States,” or “States of concern,” and other enti-
ties as terrorists against which the international community is at war.15 As well as 
States of course has been referred to as “failed States”, which is the main concern 
for this thesis.
2.2 The concept of Statehood
It is generally accepted that the State is to be considered a legal concept in inter-
national law and if this is so, then legal criteria on the basis of which it would be 
possible to determine whether an entity is State or not must also exist. The legal 
criteria for Statehood are not always obvious. Often, the laws are surpassed by 
political circumstances that instead will determine the Statehood of a nation. The 
international law however, provides a strong protection against disturbance that 
might threaten the Statehood of a once established State. Governments are pre-
sumed to be efficient, and the continuity and the identity of the state also enjoy le-
gal protection against extinction.
One of the documents often quoted on the matter of States is the Monte-
video Convention from 1933, which also has the status of international custom 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 Article53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.
12 See the Preamble and Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998.
13 See http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=1a&case=50&code=bt2&p3=4, for more 
information on the case, 2007-05-23.
14 Byers, (e.d.), 2003. p. 29.
15 Id, p. 31.
7concerning Statehood.16 The first article states that, a sovereign State as a subject 
of international law should possess the following qualifications: a permanent 
population, a defined territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations 
with the other states.17 Although there must be a population, there seems to be no 
minimum requirement with respect to the size of a state’s population. Further-
more, there is no rule prescribing a minimum size of the territory of the State.
Monaco for example only compasses of 1, 5 square kilometers. 
What matters, is not the size of the territory, but that there is an independ-
ent authority that exercises actual authority over the territory. The territory more-
over does not necessarily have to have defined or agreed external boundaries. 
There is thus no need for the existence of frontiers which are undisputed by 
neighboring states.18 The criterion of an “effective government” does not imply 
that a state has to have a certain type of government, but rather some sort of au-
thority which effectively exercises governmental functions and which is able to 
represent the state in the international context.19 The concept of State or Statehood 
furthermore has both an empirical and a juridical sense, i.e. entities can be States 
either de facto or de jure or both. 
Empirically or de facto, an entity is a State if, as in Max Weber’s influen-
tial definition, it is the organization that has a “monopoly on legitimate violence 
over a specific territory”20 which may include the armed forces, civil service or 
state bureaucracy, courts, and police. Such an entity imposes its own legal order 
over a territory, even if it is not legally recognized as a State by other States.21 The 
first sentence of article 3, in the Montevideo Convention in fact explicitly states 
that “The political existence of the State is independent of recognition by the other 
States.”22 This is known as the declarative theory of statehood. Some have ques-
tioned whether the criteria’s in the Montevideo Convention are sufficient, as they 
allow less-recognized entities or even entirely non-recognized entities to claim 
full status as States.23
While there are many different possibilities on how to understand and 
interpret the concept of Statehood as well as more criteria than the above men-
tioned exists in the debate of what a State is, and whilst it is also an area of the 
international law interesting to explore further, it goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. For the matter of this paper two additional aspects of criteria will be further 
explored; the criterion of recognition (which has been briefly mentioned above) as 
well as the efficient criterion.
                                                                                                                                                        
16 Byers, (e.d.), 2003. p. 52.
17 Article 1 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933.
18 Lysén, 2002. Folkrättsligt ansvar, en studie av EG/EU och dess medlemstater, p. 41, not 18, 19 and 20.
19 Id, p. 41.
20 Weber, 1994. The Profession and Vocation of Politics. In Political Writings, p. 43.
21 Jackson and Rosberg. 1982. Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and The Juridical in Statehood, 
p. 22.
22 Article 3, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933.
23 Lysén, 2002. p. 43.
82.2.1 Recognition as a criterion for Statehood
Recognition of States by other States as a criterion for Statehood has been ex-
plored thoroughly in the literature on international law and by no means am I by 
this brief introduction to the concept exploring all the possibilities and angels of 
the criteria and neither am I claiming to be grasping the whole concept of recog-
nition of States as a criteria for Statehood. The criteria of recognition seem how-
ever in my opinion to be more political than juridical. The concept however, is 
still important for this paper though as it also contains legal implications, depend-
ing if a State is recognized or not has connotation on how States are viewed in the 
international community and this becomes important when further exploring the 
notion of “failed States”.
In the international jurisprudence the predominant position with regard to 
recognition is the declaratory doctrine. According to this understanding, an entity 
is a State when, as soon as, it meets the empirical features linked to Statehood, as 
listed in article 1 of the Montevideo Convention. In this case, recognition is but an
affirmation of a pre-existing fact of Statehood. As such it provides evidence that a 
State has come into being, but it is itself not instrumental of that birth. Hence, 
Statehood is legitimized by the fact of its existence rather than by the act of recog-
nition as such.24 The opposition to this stand is the alternative constitutive theory 
of statehood, which claims that a state exists only insofar as it is recognized by 
other States. 25 This theory should not be confused with the Estrada doctrine 
which is the policy of recognizing States rather than governments. It is an alter-
native to the method of express recognition, in which an express statement is 
made according or withholding recognition after each unconstitutional change of 
government.26
It is generally agreed by both the supporters of the constitutive and the 
declaratory theory on recognition, that premature recognition constitutes an illegal 
act. When an entity located within the boundaries of an established State claims 
Statehood, but does not satisfy the criteria for Statehood, third State recognition of 
the entity concerned is premature and a violation of the prohibition of non-inter-
vention. The recognition of States therefore seemingly to some extent is to be
regulated by at least the same legal rules which regulate the formation of States. 
Premature recognition must, however, be distinguished from that of a hurried and 
early one. While premature recognition as described above constitutes an illegal 
act because a necessary element for Statehood is lacking, a hurried or early recog-
nition refers to a precipitate act from a political and retrospective point of view. 
The international community’s recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 1992
has been mentioned as an example of the latter situation.27
Whatever position one take on recognition it can in my opinion not be de-
                                                                                                                                                        
24 Lysén, 2002. p. 43.
25 Aalberts, 2004. The Sovereignty game State play: (Quasi-) States in the International Order, p. 250. 
26 Koskenmäki, 2004. Legal Implications Resulting from State Failure in Light of the Case of Somalia, p. 6.
27 Raic, 2002. Statehood and the law of Self-Determination, pp. 82-83.
9nied that recognition does in fact play a part for how well a State can perform its 
function in the international community and how well the State can carry out its 
duties within its territory.   
2.2.2 Efficiency as criteria for Statehood
Unlike the national legal system, the international legal order has no central organ 
that is empowered to attribute and enforce rights and obligations. Therefore, fac-
tual situations are of great importance for the evaluation of legal positions. In the 
absence of such an attributive authority, it is the international legal system that 
contains rules which require the effectiveness of certain specific factual situations 
as a precondition for the attribution of a legal status (including Statehood) and/ or 
legal rights. Effectiveness operates to some extent as evidence of the ability to 
possess legal rights and to fulfill legal obligations as a State. It follows that 
effectiveness as a pre-condition for the acquisition of a legal right is required only 
when this right is claimed or when it has to be proved. 28
The principal of effectiveness is applied in many fields of the international 
law, and because of that it is nearly impossible to give an all-embracing version of 
the concept. What can be said however is that the criterion of efficiency is con-
nected with that of recognition as well with the of Statehood, in order for a State 
to have the capacity to enter into relations with the other states, which is one of 
the criteria for Statehood, the State need both to be efficient as well as recognized 
by other States. If a State is not recognized by other State it is hard to enter into 
agreements with other States and hence it becomes hard to be efficient.
As follows by the principal of efficiency the basis in international law is 
that a government that has factual control, not necessarily total though, over the 
States territory and administration, is deemed competent to represent the State in 
the international community.29 The question then arises whether effectiveness can, 
in and of itself, create rights and duties under international law. 
Only a few authors have argued that rights are created as a result of the 
effectiveness of a factual situation. The problem with this line of thought is that it 
seems to confuse the character of a pre-condition with a source of law. It is not 
denied that effectiveness influences the acquisition of rights in international law, 
but it remains a legal notion that is coupled by international law to certain facts in
defined situations. Effectiveness is only in fact legally relevant as far as the legal 
system permits it. Therefore, effectiveness as such, as a result of a factual situa-
tion does not automatically lead to the creation of rights. Effectiveness, in this 
sense, means the quality of a fact (here the exercise of power or territorial 
jurisdiction), which according to international law makes this fact suitable as a
condition for the attribution of full international legal personality. The distinct
                                                                                                                                                        
28 Id, p. 51.
29 Id, p. 113.
10
feature of the traditional criteria for statehood is that they are, in principle, all
based on this meaning of effectiveness.30
2.3 State Sovereignty and Equality
One of the particularities of the international legal system is that it has to con-
stantly deal with the principle of equality, whereas domestic systems do not. This 
is why any substantial change in the balance between States may endanger the
whole system.31 Sovereignty has traditionally been used as a term to denote the 
collection of functions exercised by a State in the international community as well 
as internally. Initially, it implied the supremacy enjoyed by a ruler over his sub-
jects, that is, it was a term concerned with the powers within a State. Later it came 
to be used as to describe both internal powers and certain external relations of the 
State.32
The French political philosopher Jean Bodin vocalized the principle of na-
tional sovereignty in his book Les Six Livres de la Re´publique States, in which he 
claimed that the State alone possessed the power to decide how it would behave in 
the world and how it would treat its own people within its own borders and those 
under its control elsewhere. Bodin described this power as absolute authority.33
Sovereignty is in fact sometimes used to refer to the extent to which a State is free 
to behave as it whishes and this has two aspects to it; a political and a jurisdic-
tional one. 
Jurisdictional sovereignty has to do with the extent to which the State is 
under no specific or general international obligation regarding its internal be-
havior and decision. However, sovereignty does not really independently exist 
prior to State practice and international law, as its scope and meaning are consti-
tuted and regulated by diplomatic practice and international legal discourse. As 
such sovereignty is both the medium and the outcome of the practices of States 
and hence there is a political side to sovereignty as well.34
Sovereignty in simple terms represents supreme power. States are by defi-
nition sovereign and sovereignty is therefore an essential characteristic of the 
Sates as well as it continue to be a part of a State as long as the State subsist. In 
other words, sovereignty is in reality inseparable from the State.35 With this said 
however, sovereignty is considered a fact but it is not as such a principal in 
customary international law, and the principal of sovereignty is furthermore not 
absolute. When States accept international co-operation in the shape of e.g. inter-
                                                                                                                                                        
30 Id, p. 58.
31 Byers, (e.d.), 2003. p. 117.
32 Lysén, 2002. p. 45.
33 Thakur, 2004. p. 54. 
34 Aalberts, 2004. p. 250 
35 Bankas, 2005. The State Immunity Controversy in International Law: Private Suits Against Sovereign States 
in Domestic Courts, p. 2.
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national treaties, it gives up parts of it sovereignty in favor for the international 
community.36 In other words; States are sovereign to the extent that its action is 
within the limits laid down by international law and sovereignty is furthermore 
closely connected with the principal of non-intervention.37
The notion of sovereignty is an abstract perception that aims at describing 
the legal mechanisms but not the content of legal rights and duties, which in fact 
do not matter in the context of sovereignty.  If one supports this conception of 
State sovereignty, then it is unthinkable that any change in the factual situation 
could affect the foundations of the international legal system, or its functioning. If 
we can observe a relative lack of States sovereignty, it is largely a matter of the 
exercise of sovereign rights by other States. Secondly, such a conclusion could be 
drawn only if we idealize the system as it was in the past. States were not, how-
ever, “more equally sovereign” before than they are now. There have always been 
infringements on other States’ sovereignty, or, more exactly, on other States’ 
rights.38 This debates on sovereignty, center on the role of the sovereign and on 
the nature of supreme power, by what rights, and by whom, it should be exercised. 
A sovereign State can be said to be one that is independent of control by 
other States. The debate weather or not equal sovereignty states exist or not goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. It however is fairly safe to say that sovereignty has 
to some extent lost its significance in the international community. The study of 
sovereignty as a principal of law is a static one, in that it focuses attention on the 
State’s status taken individually, without taking into account the ties with other 
countries that this State may have, States are legally supposable equal. The analy-
sis of sovereignty taking place in this paper does not aim to describe the extent of 
one State’s power, but to explain why a subject of international law is legally em-
powered as a State.
                                                                                                                                                        
36 Bring, 2002. FN-stadgan och världspolitiken, Om folkrättens roll i en föränderlig värld, p. 40.
37 Lysén, 2002. p. 48.
38 Byers, (e.d.), 2003. pp. 119-120
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3 Failed States
State collapse or State failure poses a number of complex and fundamental legal,
and political dilemmas as it puts the State institution itself, the very basis of the
international system, in doubt. Whereas State collapse or failure formerly used to 
be regarded as the internal business of the respective States, and part of their 
responsibility as sovereign entities, now the acknowledgement has risen that State 
failure not only bears upon the well-being of the citizens concerned, but its impli-
cations also reaches further, i.e. to neighboring states, regional security, and to the
“global society” at large.39 The natural reaction and respond to failing states of the
international community has in the past been with humanitarian intervention and 
reconstruction of State institutions. However, after the failure in Somalia in the 
1990s and the end of the early post-Cold War international activism, interest in 
collapsed and failing States was largely lost.40 Only to be renewed again after “the 
11 September”.41
3.1 Conceptualizing “Failed States”
The concept of “failed States” first emerged in the literature by Gerald Helman 
and Steven Ratner in an article published Foreign Policy from 1992.42 The au-
thors however did not present a full scale definition of the concept and neither is 
there today a well established definition of failed States.43 Helman and Ratner 
stated that a “failed nation-state” is “[u]tterly incapable of sustaining itself as a 
member of the international community” and “[d]epending on steady streams of 
foreign assistance”.44
Robert I. Rotberg, an American scholar, has widen the definition by
constructing a scale were States are divided into strong, weak, failed and col-
lapsed states. Elements that are important in the distinction between weak and 
strong States are the level of effective delivery of the most essential public goods 
such as communications, health care, water supply and the ability to protect citi-
zens from human rights violations. The governing powers in failed States can also 
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be said not to be able to fulfill the obligations it has towards its citizens in general. 
By public goods Rotberg refers to the claim a citizen once made on a sovereign 
and now makes on a State. He also argues that there exists a hierarchy of public 
goods in which the delivery of public security is first ranked.45 Other prime func-
tions of a State are the ability to uphold the rule of law and the ability to enable 
citizens to take part of the political process. The supply of these political goods 
together constitutes the elements needed in order to decide whether a State should 
be referred to as strong or weak.46 While Rotberg’s distinctions in my opinion are 
valuable, they are not generally accepted and when reading much of the literature 
on the topic, many do not distinguish between the concept of “failed” and “col-
lapsed” States. 
I have for the purpose of clarity in this paper chosen to view Somalia as a
failed State, using Rotberg’s definition as a base, with the addition of a time quali-
fication. This because a State can be considered to be collapsed or failed in lim-
ited periods of time, that in fact will not have any further implications for the State 
as such. In order for a States failure to have real implications for itself and for the 
international community I believe that the time aspect is a vital one to consider in 
the debate, a too extensive interpretation of failed state would embrace a number
of States that temporarily lack some of the requirements for effective or legitimate 
government. 
3.2 Implications of being “failed”
After a total collapse of State institutions, a State has in practice no means to 
comply with its international obligations. This applies to all of its duties, irrespec-
tive of their origin. For instance, the enforcement of law and order in the territory 
is neglected, its own nationals and aliens residing in its territory are left un-
protected, and its contractual obligations are not implemented. Thus, State failure, 
and in particular the prolonged absence of any State organs, entails an absolute 
impossibility to comply with the international obligations of the State, and the 
State has in the eyes of the international community failed.47
Sovereignty, as we have seen, is one of the corner stones of the West-
phalia system of which the international community is built on although not con-
sidered customary. Sovereignty is part of a State as long as the States exist and as 
we also have seen States does not stop to exist simply because it is considered to 
be failed. This continuity of States is one of the most important features in modern 
international law and even if a State’s authority is interrupted, e.g. because of a 
civil war, the State continues to exist as a State.48 Therefore, I below will consider 
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certain situations in where State failure is especially hindering for a State and for 
its co-operation in the international community and also where a State’s failure 
becomes of interest to third States.  
3.2.1 Consequences for the International Community
Much about the cause, costs and impacts of internal conflicts remains essentially 
domestic; however there are significant consequences for the international com-
munity that can be traced back to internal conflicts as well. Tormented govern-
ments invite outsiders to help fight back a revolt and all of a sudden the internal 
conflict has spread across borders. Intergovernmental and external non-govern-
mental relief operations for example establishes there presents and internal con-
flicts also evoke an array of external interventions ranging from military infiltra-
tion to UN Security Council enforcement engagement authorized under chapter 
seven of the UN Charter.49
Sovereignty and Statehood are as we have seen so far in this paper the 
cornerstones of the international system that we today have, ascending from the 
Westphalia system, which of where both are closely linked to the principal of non-
intervention. The international system has however been eroded concerning these
principals since internal affairs often in fact have consequences for other members 
of the as well as for fundamental principals of international law.50
The principal of non-intervention51 is the norm in international law and 
relations that one State cannot interfere in the internal politics of another States.52
In the post-cold war era it can however be seen that new emergent norms of 
humanitarian intervention are superseding the norm of non-intervention. This is 
based upon the argument that while sovereignty gives rights to States; it also 
comes with a responsibility to protect its citizens. This has for example justified 
UN sanctioned interventions in Northern Iraq in 1991 to protect the Kurds and in 
Somalia in the absence of State power. This argument was also used (with strong 
opposition from Russia and China) to justify NATO intervention in Kosovo.53 The 
principal as such goes beyond the scope of this paper. But since it does have 
significance in the context of failed States some issues concerning the principal 
needed to be clarified. The norm of humanitarian intervention is far from fully 
formed and this fairly new emergent norm appears to only justify the action of 
States if they want to act, and does not create a duty of States to intervene. Human 
rights violations alone are seemingly not enough for a humanitarian intervention 
to take place, but such a decision usually involve other political determining fac-
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tors, such as assaults on neighboring countries, open support of terrorists and/or 
that the State in question has been identified as a failed State.54
3.2.2 The threat 
It seems that it has become a common claim that the gravest dangers to world 
security today no longer are military threats from rival States, but rather trans-
national threats emanating from the worlds most poorly governed countries. 
Poorly performing developing countries are linked to humanitarian catastrophes; 
mass migration; environmental degradation; regional instability;; international
crime; the production of weapons of mass destruction; and, of course, trans-
national terrorism. 
Francis Fukuyama, Professor of International Political Economy, states
that “[s]ince the end of the Cold War, weak and failing states have arguably be-
come the single-most important problem for international order.”55 Hence, some 
analysts and think-tanks, notably in the US, consider failed States primarily from 
a security point of view, as potential safe-havens for terrorists. As a matter of fact, 
the US government includes the concept in its National Security Guidelines of 
September 2002, considering failed States as henceforth a greater threat than
States that have ambitions of conquest. Although rich States gave little systematic 
attention to the implications of State failure before 11 September 2001, they 
nevertheless gradually adopted policies that have assumed patterns over time, thus 
shaping the resulting process that we today are experiences, meaning that of inter-
ventions in State sovereignty without legitimate reasons.56
3.2.3 Representation in the international community
State failure poses fundamental limitations upon the State’s ability to act in the 
international community. The absence of government leads inevitably to serious 
problems of representation that may entail the total exclusion of the State, and of 
its people, from international interaction.57 The question of who represents a Stat 
that is undergoing domestic conflicts in interstate forums, such as universal and 
regional organizations and conferences, has great political, legal and practical 
importance. For instance, the government accepted to represent a State might ar-
gue that the acceptance would evidence its legitimacy. State failure poses many 
dilemma with regard to representation: while in a failing State there may be sev-
eral entities claiming to be entitled to represent the country, in a failed State there
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is possibly no such entity at all. Since only an effective entity may be capable of 
fulfilling the obligations deriving from the membership, the authority that ex-
ercises effective control over the people and territory should represent a State.58
Consequently, under international law, a certain degree of institutionalized politi-
cal, administrative and executive organizational machinery which is entitled and 
capable of regulating the relations in the international community and of having 
relations with other States must exist.59
.
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4 Somalia
4.1 The Failed Somalia 
Under this heading I will give a brief background on the background of Somalia 
leading up to the current situation. I believe that it is necessary to know some of 
the history of Somalia in order to get a grasp of the profound disturbance taking 
place in today’s Somalia.
Somalia was formed by a merger of two former colonial territories: British 
Somaliland, in the north, and its larger and more populous neighbor, Italian 
Somaliland in the south.60 During the Cold war Somalia was an important stra-
tegic geographic zone. The placement of the country enabled control of the impor-
tant oil fields in the Gulf region,61 and after the declaration of independency in 
1960 Somalia became a loyal allied to the Soviet Union, however in 1969 
Mohammed Said Barre came to power and Somalia became a deputy to the USA. 
Not much changed however, the financier’s faces, the soldiers and their weapons 
origin simply shifted.62
With the end of the Cold war the situation in Somalia considerably 
changed. The USA no longer needed the country in order to counter the influence 
of the Soviet Union in the region, and Somalia was more or less left to its own 
with no economic backing and a great quantity of weapons left in the country.63
In 1991 Barre was overthrown by the United Somalia Congress, a coali-
tion of rival clans, which soon after, was divided into two fractions led by Ali 
Mahdi and Mohammed Faraha Aidid. During 1991 Somalia was worn by battles 
for territory between armed groups, mostly divided along clan lines. By contrast, 
Somaliland in the north enjoyed several months of relative peace and stability 
following its declaration of independence, and work began, with the assistance of 
non-governmental aid organizations, on rebuilding the territory’s infrastructure.
“Somaliland”, was however not recognized as an independent State by the 
international community, and consequently did not receive the significant finan-
cial aid that its economy required.64
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On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council adopted, unanimously, its 
noteworthy resolution 794, authorizing the use of “all necessary means to estab-
lish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in 
Somalia”.65 Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council authorized 
the Secretary General and the participating Member States to make arrangements 
for the unified command and control of the military forces that would be involved 
in this humanitarian intervention. The respect for State sovereignty requires 
according to resolution 46/182 from the General Assembly that consent from the 
State of concern is accumulated. This was however, overthrown by the fact that 
no government excited at the time in Somalia.66 The UN intervention in Somalia, 
UNOSOM I, also called “Operation Restore Hope” was a UN sanctioned US
military operation from 9 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. In May 1993, the UN 
officially took over the operation, and a federalist government based on 18 
autonomous regions was agreed upon by the leaders of Somalia’s various armed 
factions. The UN renamed the mission to UNOSOM II and the objective of this
intervention was to initiate nation building in Somalia, disarm the various fac-
tions, restore law and order, help the people to set up a representative government, 
and restore the infrastructure.67
Soon after the UN took over command, things started to go even more 
wrong though. General Aidid’s arrest was ordered and a price of twenty-five 
thousand dollars on his head was awarded. Aidid challenged the UN and gained
public support by siding himself with a history of Somali resistance to Italian, 
British, and Ethiopian colonizers. The remaining American airborne units led the 
increasingly violent search for Aidid, bombing suspected hideouts, and killing 
more than a thousand civilians, Aidid was however, never captured, and the UN
military profile was steadily lowered and UNOSOM II was ultimately ended in 
May 1994.68
The UN mission in Somalia clearly failed; Somalia is still missing is a 
central and efficient government that has control over the territory and the popu-
lation of Somalia and the country is still experiencing internal fighting as well as 
the country is in desperate need of aid and international help in order to rebuild 
and stabilize the country.
4.2 The Transitional Government
Since 1991 there have been 14 attempts to restore normal government in Somalia, 
with no real success. The latest began in 2004 when an interim government-in-
exile was formed in Kenya, as Somalia was considered too dangerous as base. 
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From the outset, there were tensions between rival warlords, and as the interim 
government in 2005 moved back to Somalia, the tensions worsened. For months, 
major factions within the government refused to meet in Somalia because of key 
disagreements as where to house the government and whether to accept foreign 
peacekeepers.69
From June 2006, the interim government, the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) found itself facing a new threat: the growing power of 
Islamist militias who took control of Mogadishu and a part of southern Somalia 
after a bloody three-month battle against a coalition of warlords. By late Sep-
tember, the Islamists controlled all the country’s main ports, apart from the semi-
autonomous northern enclave of Puntland and the self-declared independent en-
clave of Somaliland.70
 Although the Islamists signed a pact to recognize TFG President Yusuf’s 
government in June 2006, their formation of a national council, creation of new 
sharia courts and movement of their militia outside Mogadishu were perceived as 
a challenge to the TFG’s authority. In fact, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)
power soon eclipsed that of the shaky interim government. Grouped together in an 
organization called the Somalia Islamic Courts Council (SICC), the Islamists ini-
tially sought to be portrayed as a moderate organization and said they simply 
wanted to bring order to anarchic Mogadishu. But the rise of Sheikh Hassan Dahir 
Aweys, a hard-line Muslim minister on the UN and US “terrorist” lists, to the top 
post seem to increase the fears of the international community that the SICC 
wanted an Islamist rule.71
4.2.1 Efficient and Recognized
As tensions between the TFG and Islamists quickly escalated, the Arab League 
began mediating between the two. They cautiously agreed to a unified military 
front in early September 2006, but it was stalled over the Islamists’ demand that 
Ethiopia, the interim government’s strongest ally, should withdraw its troops from 
Somali soil. Ethiopia, which is also a US ally, had deployed troops across the bor-
der in line with a promise to defend the interim government.72
After the fall of the UIC in late December 2006 after intense fighting be-
tween SICC, troops loyal to the TFG and Ethiopian troops, the resemblance of or-
der and security that the UIC had created in Mogadishu began to deteriorate. 
Roadblocks and checkpoints returned, together with banditry and violence, de-
spite the efforts of the TFG to improve security in the capital.73
The interim government is seemingly supported by the African Union 
(AU) the UN as well as by the regional grouping, the Inter-governmental Author-
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ity on Development (IGAD).74 In February 2007 the UN Security Council passed 
resolution 1744, which put forward the idea that there shall be a national recon-
ciliation effort led by President Yusuf and the TFG Institutions and that the AU
should send in a peacekeeping force to help with this process, with possibly a UN 
force to take over at a later stage.75 Paragraph 3 of the resolution request that the 
Secretary General help assist the TFG institutions of Somalia with the organiza-
tion of a national reconciliation congress, and, more widely, promote an ongoing 
all-inclusive political process, working together with the AU, the League of Arab
States and the IGAD.76 The international community is putting pressure on the 
TFG to promote national reconciliation involving all national stakeholders.77
Not surprisingly the TFG is by the international community recognized as 
the legitimate government of Somalia. The TFG is however neither in control of 
Somalia nor is it exercising efficient governance over the country. As we have 
seen earlier in this paper efficiency and recognition however are closely linked to 
each other, and efficiency as a criterion for statehood is only a pre-condition for 
the acquisition of a legal right and it is required only when this right is claimed. 
The TFG is not claiming a right because this right has already been given to them
by the international community.
Since the fall of the UIC some of the inter- and intra-clan rivalries that 
were suppressed during the UIC control over Mogadishu and parts of the country 
has raised again and serious clan-related fighting was reported in Bardera (Gedo 
region), Tayeglo (Bakool region) and elsewhere. The TFG has yet to establish ef-
fective authority or to establish law and order in Mogadishu and other main 
population centres.78 Only wwith the help of the international community has the 
TFG maintained some level of security outside Mogadishu.79
4.2.2 Representation
In order to be recognised as well be efficient as a State in the eyes of the inter-
national community there has to be communication with the international commu-
nity.
The case of Somalia constitutes a unique episode in the history of the UN; 
the State had no representation in the organisation between the years 1992 – 2000. 
But Somalia remained unrepresented in the UN General Assembly not due to the 
rejection of credentials, but due to the absence of any government and declared 
entities.80
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Since 2004 it seems that the UN is viewing the TFG as the main channel 
of communication with the country. The Security Council among other things in 
particularly urges the Somali clan leaders to create a favourable environment for 
the future of the TFG by making determined efforts to bring about improvements 
in the security situation on the ground and reiterates that those who persist on the 
path of confrontation and conflict will be held accountable.81 Furthermore, on the 
11 May 2007, The Special Representative for Somalia, François Lonseny Fall, 
travelled to Mogadishu to appeal to the leaders of the TFG. Mr. Fall met with 
President Yusuf and Prime Minister Gedi but not with other political leaders in 
Somalia.82 The TFG also has representatives in the USA and in the UN repre-
senting Somalia.83
President Yusuf and Prime Minister Gedi, also while still residing in Nai-
robi, undertook a number of diplomatic missions to countries of the region and in
late October 2006, President Yusuf visited Ethiopia, where he held talks with the 
Chairman of the AU, Alpha Oumar Konaré, and requested AU to send 15,000 to
20,000 peacekeeping troops to Somalia. He also discussed European Union (EU)
assistance to the TFG with Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, who was visiting Ethiopia. At a joint press 
conference with President Yusuf and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles 
Zenawi, stated that the new Government of Somalia needed to move to Somalia at 
the earliest opportunity.84
Contradicting the above stated, is that the UN in other statements is urging 
both the SICC and TFG to settle there differences peacefully,85 illustrating that the 
UN at least is recognising the SICC as an organisation at a higher political, level 
in Somalia, which as such needs to be considered as a channel for communication 
as well as the TFG.
The chairman of the SICC, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, have also tried to create 
a channel of communication with the international community, writing to the UN, 
the European Union and the USA, calling for the establishment of friendly rela-
tions with the international community, based on mutual respect.86
After the fall of the UIC the main if not the only channel of communica-
tion that the international community prefers, however seems to be the TFG, 
referring to the TFG in many statements and reports as the government of So-
malia.87 Hence, declaring that the TFG is the legitimate representative of Somalia, 
as well as declaring that the international community views the TFG as the 
government that has efficient control over the territory and the population of So-
malia, although it in fact does not posses any of these things.
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4.3 The Sovereign Somalia 
In 1994 the UN declared that one of its members, Somalia, suffered from total ab-
sent of a government. This statement did not, however effect Somalia as a State, 
Somalia were and is still in the international community regarded as a sovereign 
State and no comments on the possible loss of statehood were neither made in the 
declaration.88
In several documents the UN Security Council states and reaffirm its
commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in So-
malia, and its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political inde-
pendence and unity of the country, consistent with the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the UN.  As well as several documents are stressing the need for the 
TFG Institutions in Somalia to continue working towards establishing effective
national governance in Somalia. The UN is also commending the efforts of the 
AU and IGAD in support of the TFG Institutions and welcoming the AU’s contin-
ued support for national reconciliation in Somalia.89
Somalia is traditionally run by about 100 clans. Until now, there has been
no leaning to build anything like a formal State and reacting to the recent develop-
ments in south-central Somalia, the three main political parties in “Somaliland” 
issued a press statement on 14 January 2007, reaffirming the independence of 
“Somaliland” from the TFG. Stating that “Somaliland” would oppose any claim
over their sovereignty.90 “Somaliland” and its “capital” Hargeisa are in fact doing 
quite well economically compared with other parts of Somalia, with trade coming 
in from Saudi Arabia.91 The aims of the UN, however, are to make the TFG 
institutions more representative, promote national reconciliation for the whole 
country and broaden acceptance of the TFG Charter as the framework for govern-
ance until the elections envisaged for 2009.92
Clearly the UN is wanting a united State of Somalia and there seem to be 
no wish by the international community to recognize “Somaliland” and other 
fairly stabilized entities as independent States and this is even though theses enti-
ties more than the State of Somalia seemingly are fulfilling the criteria for State-
hood, where in fact recognition is not even a requirement.
While the situation in Somalia as it is now might be viewed as the closest 
the country has come to being one in years. The Secretary-General expressed his 
grave concern about continued reports of the involvement of foreign forces in the 
current conflict. He implored all involved to respect the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Somalia.  He further urged all the countries of the region to do what-
ever they can to ensure that the parties return to the peace talks and pursue a 
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negotiated settlement of the crisis.93 The AU has also called for Ethiopian forces 
to leave Somalia following their offensive; however the UN Security Council has 
failed to agree on a statement calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Ear-
lier in December 2006, the Security Council passed a unanimous resolution to 
provide an 8,000-strong African peacekeeping force to protect the weak govern-
ment.94 Consequently, the sovereignty of Somalia is not respected and further-
more the only reason the TFG is in some sort of control is due to the interference 
of foreign troops and not because it possess control of its own. 
The Secretary General although concerned by the foreign involvement in 
Somalia has proposed an UN-sanctioned “coalition of the willing” to enforce 
peace and restore order in Somalia. Salim Lone, who was the spokesman for the 
UN mission in Iraq after the 2003 invasion and now a columnist for the Daily Na-
tion in Kenya, states in an article published in the Guardian on the 18 April 2007, 
that he is astound about this proposal from the UN Secretary General. In the 
words of Lone this means that “[t]he UN would help Ethiopia and the US
achieve what their own illegal military interventions have failed to accomplish: 
the entrenchment of a client regime that lacks any popular support. Such an opera-
tion is unlikely to succeed in any event, but it could further threaten the turbulent 
Horn of Africa, which is already teetering on the brink of chaos”.95
U.S., Ethiopian and Kenyan intelligence officials accuses some Somali 
Islamists of providing shelter to a handful of al Qaeda members, including sus-
pects in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and a 
2002 hotel bombing on the Kenyan coast. Shortly after the Islamists’ defeat, in 
January 2007, U.S. and Ethiopian attack planes launched a number of strikes on 
remote areas near the Kenyan border where the USA believed al Qaeda suspects 
were hiding. The U.S. Navy also beefed up a naval cordon along the Somali coast, 
to prevent Islamists fleeing by sea.96
Lone further argues, that resolution 1725 adopted by the Security Council 
in December 2006, in which the Security Council decided to authorize IGAD and 
the AU to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia97, actually is
disregarding the charter itself, because it makes the Security Council the aggressor 
and turned a clearly peaceful situation into war. The resolution linked the SICC to 
international terrorism and mandated peacekeeping force, on the basis of chapter 
VII of the UN charter, to address the “threat to international peace and security”
that Somalia posed, when every independent account, indicated that the country 
was experiencing its first calm period since 1991.98
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5 Conclusion
Despite the frequent reference to the “new world order”, the international commu-
nity has more or less remained traditional referred to as one of States and the 
international community as such has responded to the concept of “failed States” 
by applying an attitude of consolidation and stabilization rather than one of con-
frontation. The centrality of the State as the basic building block of the inter-
national order has been confirmed. Even when States have failed, their borders 
and legal personality have not been called in question. Such States have further-
more not lost their membership of international organizations and, for most parts; 
their diplomatic relations have remained intact. Though they are unable to enter 
into new treaty obligations, the international law treaties they have concluded re-
main in force.
Since Somalia appears to be the very definition of what a failed State is 
considered to be, Somalia is in my opinion an important country to study as well 
as closely monitor in the future. Obviously when looking closer at Somalia ques-
tions on how it will end and forth go pops up, and even if these questions goes be-
yond the scope of this paper I can’t help wondering if  the international commu-
nity have tied itself up by backing a government without any real broad national 
voting public in Somalia. The TFG led by President Yusuf is backed by the inter-
national community and even if the UN is urging a dialog with the SICC it seems 
like the UN and the international community as whole would prefer a unified So-
malia with the TFG as ruling government at least until the elections in 2009.
Every “failed or failing” State has unique problems, which means no sin-
gle policy can be applied to them. The issue of bad borders, however, either as 
relics of colonialism or of longstanding rivals, seems to crop up frequently when 
researching the concept of failed States. The only semi-stability in Somalia during 
the years of breakdown has been “Somaliland” and smaller mini entities like 
Puntland and Jubaland, which, although unrecognized internationally, have been 
the only signs of stability in a totally failed State. For the international community
to recognize these “States” as independent and sovereign would however mean 
that the State of Somalia would be dissolved. I might be going out on a limb here, 
but I believe that the international community is not willing to do so because to 
much is invested in Somalia, and even though the UN clearly failed in 1992 it is 
not about to fail again. Somalia needs to be secured as a state in order for the UN 
to regain some of its trust in the area and dissolving Somalia into smaller States 
would defeat this purpose.
According to customary international law recognition on its own is not a 
criterion for Statehood, which would mean that e.g. Somaliland in fact is a State, 
however as we have seen it is almost impossible for a non-recognized State to per-
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form its tasks as a State if not recognized by the international community and 
hence recognition in fact becomes a criterion for Statehood.  
The international community is in my opinion, by clearly appointing the 
TFG as the main channel for communication putting aside the well international 
established criteria for Statehoods. By no means can the TFG be said to be in effi-
cient control over the territory or the population of Somalia and nor is it in control 
over the means of violence in the country. The TFG is however recognized and 
furthermore considered to be the legitimate representative of Somalia by the inter-
national community. Which then would suggest that the recognition is not only a 
criterion of Statehood it actually prevails other well established criteria for State-
hood.
The fear of “terrorism” in Somalia seems to be one of the main reasons be-
hind the backing of the TFG as the representative of Somalia. In the international 
community, no matter what grievances and internal conflicts a nation may have 
aggressive warfare is an illegal means for settling those grievances according to 
the non-intervention principal which we know is a well-established principal in 
international law. The US-UN backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to prevent 
the SICC from expanding its influence all over Somalia should in my opinion, 
agreeing with Siam Lone, is to be regarded as an act of aggression, a violation of 
the UN Charter and an infringement of international law. The SICC never im-
posed a threat to international peace and security, rather in the aftermath of the 
quick victory declared by Ethiopia over the UIC, continuing unrest and attacks 
has occurred and escalated in Somalia.
The UN Security Council did nothing, as Ethiopia invaded, and as the U.S. 
bombed Somalia and instead it is now working to legitimize Ethiopia’s US-
backed invasion and occupation of Somalia. In my opinion and it also follows by 
the principal of efficiency, that the basis in international law is that a government 
that has factual control, not necessarily total though, over the States territory and 
administration, is deemed competent to represent the State in the international 
community. The TFG was not in control over the territory of Somalia when it 
consented to the U.S. bombings and neither was it in control when Ethiopia as-
saulted the territory of Somalia. Rather the TFG came in to control due to the 
bombings and the invasion of USA and Ethiopia.
In the case of Somalia as a “failed” State, the international community has 
been and is reluctant to view Somalia as something else than a State which have 
had sever implications for Somalia as an actor in the international community.
The sovereignty of Somalia has clearly been violated and trespasses in to Somalia 
have definitely been made and this is due to the fact that Somalia is being viewed 
as State with the responsibilities and rights of a State. Clearly, it is problematical 
for a “failed” State to function as a State in the eyes of the international commu-
nity, therefore the international community when dealing with “failed” States 
should withdrawn from treating the territory as a State with the legal implications 
that that may have. Instead the international community should, in my opinion, 
operate on a case by case basis and making sure that all voices in the “failed” 
State is heard and represented in the international community, so that legitimate 
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representation of the State or the different States the original State may contain 
can be achieved.
The current situation in Somalia may represent the best opportunity that 
Somalia has had in years to find a long-term solution to its extended conflicts by 
putting in place a functioning and effective State under the framework of the TFG 
Charter with the help of the international community. At the same time though, 
the risks of renewed and prolonged insecurity will increase unless the TFG is able 
to rapidly fuse its authority and ensure stability and the rule of law as well as 
promote dialogue with all of the political leaders in Somalia. Even if I might dis-
agree with reasons why the international community is present in Somalia, it is 
important however that they do not withdraw too quickly and that the inter-
national community sees its actions through. 
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